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Anti-Reductionist Christian
Philosophy in the Twentieth
Century: Owen Barfield and
the Neo-Calvinists

by Jamin Hübner
Introduction
Modern philosophy, the scientific revolution,
and the Enlightenment together forged a powerful
combination of ideas and cultural liturgies that affected and continue to affect virtually every area
of human life. One key aspect of this era and its
effect is a tendency towards reductionism of all
kinds. Whether in the foundationalist epistemolDr. Jamin Andreas Hübner is a Research Fellow for
the Center of Faith and Human Flourishing at LCC
International University (Klaipéda, Lithuania), and
a professor in the social sciences at the University of
the People (global) and Western Dakota Tech (Rapid
City, South Dakota).

ogy of Descartes, the atomistic tendencies of physical science, or the all-encompassing metanarratives
of “progress” in economic life, one can easily trace
the development of this intoxicating social and intellectual phenomenon. Still today, for example,
many thinkers in the science-philosophy dialogue
continue to wash the smell of Ernest Rutherford’s
quip out of their clothes: “All science is either physics or stamp collecting.”1
But not everyone was (or is) on-board with the
Enlightenment project and its tendency to funnel
all of life down into a single principle, purpose, or
story. The philosopher and critic Owen Barfield
(1898-1997), along with Abraham Kuyper (18371920), Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), and
Dooyeweerd successor Roy Clouser (1937-), fiercely
resisted this movement, earning themselves the reputation of being “non-reductionists” or “anti-reductionists.”2 There is little direct relationship between
Barfield and the aforementioned “Neocalvinists,”3
and on the surface, these two streams of thought
couldn’t be more different. Yet, they came to some
of the same conclusions on this important subject
and even according to similar reasoning. The purpose of this article is to look at how and why each
thinker addressed the problem of reductionism,
highlight the common threads among their critiques and innovative solutions, and consider the
enduring relevance of this particular intellectual
sub-tradition.
Pro Rege—March 2021
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On Reductionism
If one peruses such reference works as the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, it becomes
clear that one of the central concerns surrounding
reductionism is a sense of exclusion or elimination.
In order to properly peer through a microscope, for
example, one must block off one’s vision of everything else.4 It is common for reductionism to be
associated with physicalist (i.e., materialist) reductionism and ontological eliminativism, but this
association is not always appropriate. Idealists like
Bishop Berkeley or Johann Fichte either denied the
existence of matter or asserted that everything that
is real is mental.
A more sophisticated example is offered by
emergentists, who speak of reduction without
collapsing it into a fuller sense of reductionism.
This approach can be attributed to the fact that
“Emergent properties are irreducible to, and unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena from
which they emerge.”5 More specifically, “there are
two forms of causality that are not reducible to
physical causes,” and (at least in Clayton’s view)
this point is significant because “causality should
be our primary guide to ontology.”6 A magnetic
field generated by certain atoms in a certain state
introduces a whole new level of reality (for a lack of
better words), with its own properties and features
that simply don’t exist on the lower level. Another
example is explained by John Searle:
Consciousness is a causally emergent property
of systems. It is an emergent feature of certain
systems of neurons in the same way that solidity
and liquidity are emergent features of systems
of molecules. The existence of consciousness
can be explained by the causal interactions between elements of the brain at the micro level,
but consciousness cannot itself be deduced or
calculated from the sheer physical structure of
the neurons without some additional account of
the causal relations between them.7

In the broader purview of Searle’s account,
there are at least five kinds of reductionisms: (1)
ontological,8 (2) property ontological,9 (3) theoretical,10 (4) logical or definitional,11and (5) causal.12
Other contemporary thinkers, including Michael
Tooley, propose a much different fourfold schema:
26
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(1) “strong reductionism with respect to causal relations,” (2) “weak reductionism with respect to
causal relations,” (3) “strong reductionism with
respect to causal laws,” (4) “weak reductionism
with respect to causal laws.”13 It is not necessary to
elaborate on these classifications. But it is apparent
that there are many ways of thinking about what it
means to “reduce”—and ways to avoid doing it; the
results of such reduction can vary.
Despite exceptions, “Most contemporary reductionist as well as eliminativist positions include
some commitment to materialism or physicalism —
the view that the physical or material provides the
fundamental reductive base.”14 Indeed, as Searle
notes in the same aforementioned essay, “In general in the history of science, successful causal reductions tend to lead to ontological reductions.”15
Tooley, likewise, observes that “the history of the
philosophy of causation since the time of Hume
has been largely the history of attempts to offer
reductionist accounts of causal laws and of causal
relations, and most philosophers have been content
simply to assume that a reductionist approach to
causality must be correct.”16
This widely acknowledged trend is particularly
vivid in the natural sciences, where the rationalist
and materialist bent of the Enlightenment project
comes into full swing. As the German liberation
theologian Jürgen Moltmann so concisely put it,
The modern world began with the rise of the exact sciences. The sciences became exact through
the “reduction of science to mathematics” (reduction scientiae ad mathematicum). The concern that guided perception was freedom from
natural forces that were not understood, and
the mastery over them. For Descartes, it was the
concern to make the human being “the lord and
possessor of nature”; for the devout Francis Bacon, it was the restoration of the likeness to God
by way of lordship over the earth (dominum terrae). How can power over nature be acquired
through knowledge? Through the application
of the old Roman method, divide et impera—
”divide and rule.” If natural formations are split
up into their individual parts, and one perceives
how they are put together and function, they
can be “dominated,” and a separate formation
can be constructed from their individual parts.17

revolutions, and the rise of the modern university
It was this type of reductionism—an elevation
and new fields of study that (seemed to) threaten reof the natural sciences and its methods against all
ligion itself (e.g., higher criticism, textual criticism,
others (along with a dogged legitimation of this eltheories of religious origins, Darwinian evolution,
evation and its results)—that became a serious coneconomics, anthropology, psychology, etc.), not to
cern to some twentieth-century thinkers. The isolamention the first World War. While he is known
tion, exclusion, and elimination of anything that
for many things, perhaps his most well-known
doesn’t fit forged many of the key events and ideas
intellectual contribution is “sphere sovereignty”—
of the twentieth century, which was in many ways
against the backdrop of political hegemony and the
an epic projection of modern values—and, notably,
modern dualism of sacred vs. secular. Sphere sovthe bloodiest century in history.18
ereignty was the more practical version of a fuller
This is the broader context through which the
non-reductionist philosophy that was later develwork of Barfield and the Neocalvinists should be
oped by his followers.
understood. The problem was
As an “anti-revolutionnot simply the rise of science
The isolation, exclusion,
ary” politician and eventualand decline of religion; it
and elimination of
ly the Prime Minister of the
was an ethos of conquering,
controlling, and the absuranything that doesn‘t fit Netherlands (1901-1905),
Kuyper was concerned with
dities resulting from breakforged
many
of
the
key
upholding order, explains
ing everything apart in
events
and
ideas
of
the
Lew Daly: “Like Groen,
hopes of mastering it. This
Kuyper opposed the secuepistemological colonialism
twentieth century ….
larism and individualism of
alarmed both Barfield and
the French Revolution as the
the Neocalvinists, who took
most dangerous threat to a just social order. These
it upon themselves to develop viable alternatives.
modes of thought threatened to destroy the natural community by elevating individuals and allying
Neocalvinist Anti-Reductionism in Abraham
them, through individual rights, with the secular
Kuyper
state—hence the ‘anti-revolutionary’ response in
In response to reductionism, here is the beDutch politics.”20
ginning of Abraham Kuyper’s famous lecture
Kuyper himself put it this way: “In a Calvinistic
“Uniformity: The Curse of Modern Life” (April
sense we understand, hereby, that the family, busi22, 1869), delivered from the stage of the Odeon
ness, science, art and so forth are all social spheres,
Theater in Amsterdam:
which do not owe their existence to the State, and
Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe I am within
which do not derive the law of their life from the
the scope of this lecture series if this evening I
superiority of the state, but obey a high authority
ask you to consider with me, from a Christianwithin their own bosom; an authority which rules,
historical viewpoint, the false uniformity of
by the grace of God, just as the sovereignty of the
our age. This phenomenon is of great interest
State does.”21
precisely because the sustained drive of our age
As a theologian, Kuyper was also concerned
toward uniformity is such a dubious feature—I
19
about the preservation of the church and maintaindare say, the curse—of modern life.
ing its relevance to every area of life. In his view,
Kuyper was both a theologian and a statesman
there are no disciplines or domains of creation that
who tried to make sense of his Calvinist religious
are truly secular, as everything is under the direction
heritage during one of the most tumultuous peof the one, true Sovereign. As religious life became
riods of human history. During his lifetime, he
more and more compartmentalized, marginalized,
and alienated in modern society, it became neceswitnessed the immediate effects of the Industrial
Revolution, global trade, colonialism and mass imsary for the church to actively reclaim God’s reign
migrations, the rise of nation states and political
over each area of life. Kuyper’s response was the
Pro Rege—March 2021
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model of sphere sovereignty: “God established the
institutions of various kinds, and to each of these
He awarded a certain measure of power. He thus
divided the power He had available for distribution.
He did not give all his power to one single institution but gave to every one of these institutions the
power that coincided with its nature and calling.”22
This model addressed two contemporary problems: the reduction of religious life to a marginalized role (e.g., morality and spiritual things), and
the centralization of political power that overstepped its bounds and threatened national independence. Together, the forces of modernity threatened cultural diversity in general, and Kuyper’s
modified Reformed theology (hence neocalvinism)
was the answer.
Yet this model was formulated within the framework of classical western theism and high Calvinist
theology (hence neocalvinism), as evidenced in
specific linguistic choices of the model: “There is
a domain of nature in which the Sovereign exerts
power over matter according to fixed laws. There
is also a domain of the personal, of the household,
of science, of social and ecclesiastical life, each of
which obeys its own laws of life, each subject to its
own chief.23
The metaphors for God and power are political
(perhaps even feudalistic): “Sovereign,” “domain,”
“power,” “fixed laws,” “obeys,” “subject to,” “chief.”
Far from being theologically neutral (which, Kuyper
realized in other contexts, is impossible),24 these
terms reinforce certain conceptions about God,
creation, and human relationships.25 However, for
Kuyper, still steeped in post-Reformation scholasticism, this framework was simply the “biblical”
one and therefore the “right” one; he saw himself
as merely relaying timeless, permanent truths in yet
a constructive manner that addressed the problems
of his time.26
This tradition also, ironically, exhibited its own
reductionistic baggage such as the self-authenticating Scripture27 within theological methodology.28
How consistent this overall model was in either
protecting against the encroachments of the state or
re-empowering the church is also debatable.29 Note,
for instance, that the state’s purpose was to “make
it possible for the various [social] spheres, insofar as
they manifest themselves externally, to interact ap28
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propriately, and to keep each sphere within its proper limits.”30 In addition, every sphere (e.g., church,
school, business, etc.) was responsible for submitting to the justice of the single state. Kuyper maintained this hierarchy of power in the home under
exceptionally rigid patriarchal ideas.31 There have
also been concerns about how much Kuyper exaggerated the situation, whether about women’s cultural place32 or the impacts of racial intermixing.33
Despite these issues, Kuyper’s anti-imperialism
and anti-reductionistic goals were both understandable and explicit, and they were an outgrowth
of the larger problem of uniformity that he had
railed against a decade earlier. There, on the stage
in Amsterdam, he elaborated the totalizing nature
of uniformity: “Its attempts to blend all shades into
the blank darkness of the grave are becoming ever
obvious. Even more shrilly it cries out that in our
modern society, everything, however distinctive
in nature, must be shaped by one model, cut to a
single pattern, poured into one fixed mold.”34
There was no facet of human life or field of
knowledge that wasn’t stained by this reductionistic tendency; it could be found with regard to architecture, city design, the collapsing of gender roles,
language, science and biology,35 and especially public and political life.36 As he stated in exasperation,
“So here we are. Everything has to be equalized and
leveled; all diversity must be whittled down…[until] every difference disappears.”37
Neocalvinist Anti-Reductionism in
Dooyeweerd and Roy Clouser
Around the time of Kuyper’s death, Herman
Dooyeweerd had finished his secondary education at a Neocalvinist school and was attending
Kuyper’s Free University (Amsterdam) to study
law. There, Dooyeweerd was disappointed that
he didn’t see Kupyer’s version of Calvinism being
applied to jurisprudence. There, explains Roger
Henderson, “He saw a need for ‘the philosophical
legal foundations of jurisprudence,’ and was eventually drawn to a study of the philosophy of law for
this purpose.”38
After Dooyeweerd brainstormed with his friend
and brother-in-law Dirk Vollenhoven, his interests
quickly expanded. The two of them began “working on questions of epistemology and the founda-

tions of science from a Christian point of view.
From the 1920 letter, we know that one topic of
their discussion was the source of epistemological
norms, and the nature and basis of their validity.”39
By 1922-23, Dooyeweerd realized that Kuyper’s
idea of sphere sovereignty could be applied to jurisprudence and epistemology in general. As each
sphere is ruled by its own type of laws, Dooyweerd
stated the following:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Analytical: distinction, conceptualization
Formative: formative power, achievement,
technology, technique
Lingual: symbolic communication
Social: social interaction
Economic: frugal use of resources
Aesthetic: harmony, surprise, fun
Juridical: due (rights, responsibility)
Ethical: self-giving love
Pistic: faith, vision, commitment, belief.

[It}is understandable that the newly arising refFor Dooyeweerd, this proposal came with a
ormational philosophy … would only acknowlfew caveats, as explained
edge a biblically anchored
by Henderson. First, all
idea of law and its correBy 1922-23,
concrete entities function
late, the creaturely subjecDooyeweerd realized
in every sphere; so (for extum, as its basic philosophample), “anything can be an
ical ideas .… Each fact of
that Kuyper‘s idea of
object of justice.”44 Second,
human life is subject to
sphere sovereignty
all spheres are interconits own law. Things have
their own place and act
nected and coherent; they
could be applied to
in response to their own
display elements of each
jurisprudence and
laws, the laws holding for
other. Third, “A conflict bethem. This is why scholarly
tween legality and morality
epistemology in
thought is unable to group
is impossible because both
general.
variety under a single comorders cover different termon denomination, law
rains.”45 (One might comor logic …. [And]no sinpare this point loosely/analogically with the view
gle explanation can be produced by analytical
of NOMA, “Non-Overlapping Magisteria,” in the
means which will furnish us with a legitimate
science-religion conversation.46)
idea of unity.40

Instead of Kuyper’s societal spheres, Dooyweerd’s
thought proposed epistemological spheres—though
these two larger categories were connected. “Natural
law,” for example, simply is the epistemology of the
sphere of government. This way of thinking offered a better alternative to the dualisms of scholastic Thomism, the antimonies of Kant, and the
epistemological problems of idealism and realism.41
Dooyeweerd was “both a pluralist and an antireductionist; he accepted the diversity of created reality as
basic.”42
Dooyeweerd proposed fifteen modal law
spheres:43
•
•
•
•
•

Spatial: continuous extension
Kinematic: flowing movement
Physical: energy, matter
Biotic/Organic: life functions, self-maintenance
Sensitive/Psychic: feeling and response

The problem, however, was how any of the
spheres relate to each of the others. In Dooyeweerd’s
thought, this relationship constitutes the cosmonomic law idea, and this law idea could only
originate (rightly) from basic religious conviction,
or (erroneously) as an absolutization of one of the
law spheres. Either way, this step towards unity was
religious: “However hard human reason, which is
subject to the law, strains itself to construct a rational unity between the independent spheres of law,
it will never succeed. This is a modern repetition of
the tower of Babel!... Undoubtedly there is a unity,
a divine synthesis in God’s creative plan; but unity
is a supra-rational one.47
Hence, the title of the major work by
Dooyweerd’s successor Roy Clouser was The Myth
of Religious Neutrality. Clouser’s reformulation of
Dooyeweerd’s thought begins with a discussion
surrounding the question “what is a theory?”48
There, the problem of reductionism via mental abPro Rege—March 2021
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straction comes to the fore: “By abstracting properties, we create the possibility of asking about the
relations between these properties, and of looking
for patterns of connections among those relations,
all of which are being conceived in isolation from
any things or events in which they may occur.”49
Abstraction is virtually a necessary (though not
sufficient) condition for the kind of reductionism
Clouser is critiquing.
In addition, laws come into the picture because
they are “the most important of the relations that
can be discovered” in theories.50 Such “propertiesand-laws have been abstracted and made into specific areas of study.”51 Clouser calls these areas “aspects,” and he calls the study of them “sciences.”
The fifteen aspects are “only intended to help us
understand the major branches of present-day
theory making, not to arrive at the one true list of
genuine aspects of the world.”52
This practice in epistemology is inescapable:
“Without the abstraction of entire aspects, it would
not be possible to specify the kind of properties being investigated or the kind of laws being used to
explain whatever a theory is seeking to explain….
[Thus] the abstraction of aspects is essential to theorizing.”53 The problem with modernity, then, was
that it went from necessary abstraction to absolutizing abstraction.
Like Dooyeweerd, Clouser highlighted the
challenge of relating aspects to a general theory (ontology in philosophy) and identifying its religious
nature. The problem of western philosophy was its
reducing all of life to the properties and laws of one
or two spheres, without realizing the organic, weblike construction of knowledge—and therefore of
reality.54 Doing so would be like looking at a beaded necklace and saying, “this bead is holding them
altogether” instead of pointing at the string inside
all of them. As Andrew Basden explains, “No aspect can be reduced to others, and this proposal
explains the diversity. Yet no aspect can be isolated from the others, and this explains the unity.”55
Further, as Clouser explains, this framework avoids
the pitfall of scientism: “Experiments, although desirable, are often not possible and a theory is not
discarded just because it is not subject to experimental testing…. [And] while it is true that there
are philosophical theories that have opposed one
30
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another for centuries, this is not because theories of
science are always provable while the philosophical
theories never are, nor is it because of the presence
or lack of experiments.”56
Thus, Dooyweerd’s and Clouser’s understanding of aspects, knowledge, and interrelations of
knowledge directly addresses the central problem
of empiricism and scientific reductionism.
Anti-Reductionism in Barfield
Barfield’s anti-reductionist philosophy is far
less systematic than Clouser’s aspectual philosophy
and less politically oriented than Kuyper’s sphere
sovereignty. Barfield was concerned with education
(relating to knowledge), and especially linguistics
(relating to meaning).
The recent move away from classical liberal arts
education towards economic specialization and
compartmentalization at the modern university
deeply concerned Barfield. More concerning, however, were the toxic assumptions underneath this
social phenomenon, which was creatively explored
in his fictional work, Worlds Apart. In it, a physicist,
biologist, psychiatrist, lawyer-philologist, linguistic
analyst, theologian, retired schoolteacher, and employee of a rocket research station get together at
a summit meeting and discuss the problem of the
“disagreeable impression of watertight compartments.”57 Can such specialists have a meaningful
conversation with each other and integrate their
knowledge in practical ways? As focused as the
question seems, this diverse roster is enough to
launch the conversation down a number of rabbit
trails.
Not far into the initial phases of the meeting,
the reductionistic tendencies of science come to
the fore: “This is where modern science came in.
Its whole basis—the very thing that was new about
it—was the assumption that, if you want to know
about things, you must assume that they are merely
things. You must treat them as objects for the senses, but as independent in all other respects of man
and his spirit and his values.58
With this basic problem on the table, the impossibility of objectivity in epistemology becomes
a talking point: “First they [science enthusiasts]
insist on cutting out awe and reverence and wisdom and substituting sophistication as the goal of

a person visiting a university, where he is introknowledge; and then they talk about this method
duced to all the “colleges,” but who, after the tour
of theirs with reverence and awe and expect us to
is over, asks, “but where’s the university?” After this
look up to them as wise and venerable men.”59 In
somewhat humorous ending, Dunn (the “linguist
other words, there is a double-standard when it
philosopher”) is asked if it is good and useful at all
comes to the elevation of hard science; it wants
to have the word “university” refer to all the “colto be seen as not only neutral (i.e, unhindered by
leges.” Dunn responds,
those pesky subjective or religious motivations) but
even more than neutral (i.e., inherently admirable
“Yes, of course it is. Not only useful but necesand respectable) at the same time.60
sary for a large number of practical purposes. The
The modern, scientific, and foundationalist episconfusion only arises—and this is the moral of
temology comes with a hidden risk: “Haven’t you got
the story—if you start fancying that the universimply a huge inverted pyrasity is itself one of the colmid of ideas—mathematics,
leges, or so much like one
Like Dooyeweerd,
if you like—erected on a tiny
of the colleges that you can
apex of ascertained facts?”
Clouser highlighted the say things about it which
asks the character Sanderson
only have any meaning
challenge of relating
when they are said of col[most closely representing
lege-buildings …. [I]ntroBarfield’s own views]. “An
aspects to a general
duce a word like ‘university’
apex that is getting smaller
theory
(ontology
into a sentence to which
and smaller every day? More
only words like ‘college’ bein philosophy) and
and more piled on less and
61
long, and you will be talkless?”
identifying its religious ing nonsense, though you
Eventually, the characmay believe you are saying
nature.
ter Hunter (the theologian)
something very original
pushes this issue further to
and very exciting.”65
show the impossibility of religious neutrality:
This pithy lesson is then used to sharply correct
“I have been trying to show you [character Upthe
classic problem of mind-brain reductionism:
water] that you yourself are a supernaturalist—
in the sense in which you are using the word—
because you always do in practice assume that
there is something other than the total process
of irrational nature, and that we participate in
that other every time we think a valid thought
…. [Y]ou can never, without talking nonsense,
obliterate the ultimate cleavage between (a)
consciousness itself and (b) that of which it is
conscious …. Your denial is like a sentence consisting of the words ‘This is not a sentence.’”62

One might immediately note that the assertion
about “the total process of nature” and our participation in it is remarkably similar to Dooyeweerd’s
cosmonomic law idea. Furthermore, the supernaturalist presumption is essentially the same point
made by Clouser regarding the role of “religion.”63
The dialogue continues as Barfield tells a short
story that largely overlaps contemporary emergentists.64 It also introduces Barfield’s more linguisticoriented critique of reductionism. The story is about

Dunn: “No one but a fool would argue that the
word ‘mind’ and the word ‘brain’ mean the same
thing. But the question whether some supposed
thing called ‘the mind’ is or is not the same
thing as something else called ‘the brain’ is a
question that cannot be answered for the simple
reason that it cannot be asked.”
Ranger: “But it was asked!”
Dunn: “So was the question ‘And now where
is the university?’ Can’t you see the point? As
Hunter said yesterday, the obvious is the hardest thing of all to point out to anyone who is
genuinely aware of it.”66

Here one sees how important the linguistic dimension can be—because abstraction and reduction occur through language.67 It is no wonder that
Barfield begins his seminal work, Poetic Diction, by
showing the absurdity of such totalizing:

Pro Rege—March 2021

31

It is a failing common to a good many contemporary metaphysical theories that they can
be applied to all things except themselves but
that, when so applied, they extinguish themselves; and experience has taught me that when
men are really attached to such a theory, most
of them will, after this has been pointed out to
them, continue nevertheless to apply it to all
things (except itself ). The reason is rather that
those who must think about language and the
world in that particular way have gone further
since then and abolished the idea of a “referent”
altogether.68

Barfield here put his finger on an important
trend that would come into fruition in the work of
the 1960s-70s’ French intellectuals: modernism’s
reductionism in language gave birth to the ultra-reductionistic postmodern idea of non/self-referential
language, where “there is no outside text” (Derrida)
and “socialization … goes all the way down”
(Rorty).69 Barfield took issue with this suggestion
on several occasions,70 and at the forefront of this
problem is logical positivism:
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus,
which Bertrand Russell translated into English in 1922, … [is the] broom with which …
[he] hoped to sweep away, as meaningless, all
statements not related to physically observable
or verifiable events, to limit the sphere of man’s
knowledge to the increasingly tentative findings
of physical science, and to dismiss all other affirmations as meaningless. For all propositions
except those from which some observationstatement can be deduced are, as it averred,
meaningless, either as misuses of language, or
as tautologies.71

Barfield pulls no punches about how dangerous
this trajectory really is:
Before he even begins to write, the Logical Positivist has taken the step from “I prefer not to
interest myself in propositions which cannot be
empirically verified” to “all propositions which
cannot be empirically verified are meaningless.”
The next step to “I shall legislate to prevent
anyone else wasting his time on meaningless
propositions” is unlikely to appear either illogi-

32
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cal or negative to his successor in title. Those
who mistake efficiency for meaning inevitably
end by loving compulsion, even if it takes them,
like Bernard Shaw, the best part of a lifetime to
get there.72

The quip about mistaking “efficiency for meaning” deserves special comment. These words were
written in the age of automobile assembly lines, the
“Roaring ‘20s,” and the central banking experiments of Keynesian economics. Never before was
the world producing so much—all by the division
of labor, specialization of disciplines, and rigorous
application of physical science—in a word, the
“old Roman way” of “dividing and conquering”
(Moltmann). Barfield then asks the obvious and
extremely relevant question: “What is efficiency
without meaning?”73
Barfield was clear: when scientific reductionism
takes over language itself, the result is meaninglessness in the way that people use language. It is for the
same reason that if words are isolated from sentences, the sentence is no longer an organic whole
of any semantic value. To use another analogy, if
all language forms (literal, symbolic, figurative) are
reduced to binary code or math, the result is an
obliteration of human experience. (A poet understands this better than anyone else.) He wrote, “If
therefore they succeed in expunging from language
all the substance of its past, in which it is naturally
so rich, and finally converting it into the species of
algebra that is best adapted to the use of indoctrination and empirical science, a long and important
step forward will have been taken in the selfless
cause of the liquidation of the human spirit.74
Barfield believed that science and logic can
clarify and empower but have their limits.75 When
they don’t, they drag all of life down through the
microscope and into the dark void. “Science deals
with the world which it perceives,” he warns, “but
seeking more and more to penetrate the veil of naïve perception, progresses only towards the goal of
nothing.”76 Indeed, for Barfield, true science does
not set the agenda for the human race, or even for
knowledge, for “Only by imagination … can the
world be known. And what is needed is, not only
that larger and larger telescopes and more and
more sensitive calipers should be constructed, but

trine of “organic inspiration.” As Bavinck writes,
that the human mind should become increasingly
“Organic inspiration is ‘graphic’ inspiration, and
aware of its own creative activity.”77
it is foolish to distinguish inspired thoughts from
In the book of nature, the whole may mean
words and words from letters. Scripture must not
something, but the details mean nothing; or if
be read atomistically, as though each word or letthey do, we can never know it. The opposite is true,
ter by itself has its own divine meaning. Words are
Barfield explains, when we read an actual book.
included in thoughts and vowels in words. The full
There the meaning of the whole is articulated from
humanity of human language is taken seriously
the meaning of each part—chapters from sentences
in the notion of organic inspiration.”81 This “orand sentences from words—and stands before us
78
ganic” model was meant to avoid the reductionism
in clear, sharp outlines. The vital question with
of “dictation theory” and “verbal plenary inspirawhich Barfield deals is whether science can ever
tion” of the written text itself (an idea central to
discover how to read the book of nature in this way.
B. B. Warfield, Bavinck’s
It would not matter so much
American colleague at Old
if its field were limited to
Barfield was clear:
Princeton).
mechanics and physics. But,
when scientific
Barfield’s passionate arin fact, man looks more and
guments are extremely simimore to science for guidreductionism takes
lar to Kuyper’s lecture on
ance on all subjects. As we
over
language
the “Curse of Uniformity,”
rise in the scale of creation
itself,
the
result
is
especially Barfield’s reflecfrom the lifeless to the living
tions on social equalities.
and from the living to the
meaninglessness in
“The principle of equality is
psychic and human—from
the way that people
both a curse and a blessing,”
mechanics to sociology—
Barfield opines. “It is a blessthe question of the meanuse language.
ing, and an indispensable
ing of what we are dealing
one, where it belongs, particularly for instance, in
with becomes ever more insistent. He wonders if
the rule of law: it is a curse when it takes the bit
this pursuit of meaning must always be ignored or
between its teeth, or goes to and fro like a roaring
if science ever learns to supplement its weighing,
lion, seeking what it may devour, because then it
measuring, and statistics with the systematic use of
involves the reduction of human relations to sideimagination.79
by-sideness, as I’ve called it, and so it eliminates
In a word, then, human abstractions and reducmutual participation.”82 Kuyper and Clouser would
tions for the sake of categorization and knowledge
can never be immortalized and made permanent—
have applauded. The same goes for Barfield’s disat least if one is looking for meaning. This is betinction between subject (conscious perceiver) and
cause meaning is the result of zooming out, of placobject (the perceived), which modernism threating atoms, words, and persons inside a larger conened to collapse.
text. Hence, he writes famously, “Words are only
Furthermore, it is more generally clear that
themselves by being more than themselves. Perhaps
the topic and systematic activity of abstraction is
the same thing is true of human beings.”80
as central for Barfield, in his non-reductionist enterprise, as for Clouser. Scientists in the natural
Similarities and Divergences
sciences regularly forget that in their work of findUpon further reflection, a number of inordiing “material causes” and “classification,” they are
nately specific parallels between Barfield and the
in the business of downward-facing (i.e., “lowerNeocalvinists’ anti-reductionism campaign emerge.
level”) abstraction.83 Because the modern sciences
were carried away with their own accomplishments
For example, it is noteworthy that Kuyper’s successor Herman Bavinck made the same point for the
and Enlightenment optimism, they assumed that
“book of scripture” that Barfield made above for
they knew how language worked (and had worked).
the “book of nature.” This is the Neocalvinist docBut they were unaware that a scientific revolution
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is intimately connected with a linguistic revolution:
The system of mental constructs called mathematics is, I suppose, about as “self-referring” a
language form as could well be imagined—and
yet it is also effective outside itself, effective both
in discovery and in operation. So much so, that
it has given birth to our present technological
civilization. But it is only by returning from
time to time from the informal language to the
formal language of description that this connection with the natural process can be maintained.
Bohm maintains moreover that the unresolved
duality between the two language forms has
been operating to conceal the revolutionary
change in language form which has in fact been
taking place. There has been a steadily increasing tendency to assume that informal language
forms no longer matter much, and that all the
real business of physics is transacted in formal
language—its informal brother being confined
to those invented “models,” whose sole function
is to give to the poor layman with no mathematics some sort of fanciful picture of what is
being (or perhaps is not being) talked about.84

Modernism privileged the quantifiable and literal, and undermined the metaphorical and figurative—to the continued peril of all.
But perhaps the most interesting (and ironically) shared ground between Barfield and the
Neocalvinists is their belief in the unity and oneness
of the universe—ironic because, in some sense, it is
possibly the highest form of reductionism and abstraction. For Kuyper, the universe is God’s creation,
not to be confused with the Creator, and everything
that is not-God is created. For Clouser, the same remains true, but the unification of all the aspects of
creation is based on logical necessity (i.e., the string
holding the beads together). For Barfield, the theosophist, “Spirit…is not that which is perceived, but
that which is. It is not what we perceive, but what we
are.”85 And “it seems clear to me that by ‘spirit’ we
must mean ‘that which is not matter,’ and by ‘that
which is not matter’ we mean that part of the totality
which is not perceptible through the senses. If the totality is ultimately one, as I hold (with Leibniz), then
it is perhaps better to speak of one phase of the totality rather than one part of it.”86 These are totalizing
ideas—and powerful ones, since the history of reli34
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gion has shown this “upward-reductionism” (zooming out: religion, philosophy) to be as potentially
intoxicating as “downward-reductionism” (zooming
in: physics, biology).87
Thankfully, these thinkers are generally aware
of the weight of what they are suggesting, and they
contend that meaning is not found simply in zooming out to the forest but in the process of zooming
in and out from the big to the small altogether.
However, this all-encompassing perspective on the
universe, even if undeveloped, is an important reminder that even in the context of anti-reductionist
philosophy and theology, it is impossible to escape
generalities and making assertions about the whole
of which one knows perhaps very little.
The biggest points of divergence are probably in
the role of theological starting points. Barfield does
not make his arguments on the basis of classical,
Western monotheism (much less a Calvinist flavor).
He acknowledges something proprietary about the
Christian story; but, in the context of his intellectual concern with the “evolution of consciousness,”
he contends that “we are approaching a time when
no individual path to salvation, or what you will,
will be valid for men, which does not also take consciously up into itself the longer agony of history.”88
He believes in a “Divine Spirit,” through whom all
persons are connected, and who can be experienced
in multiple religious traditions. His critique is more
directly practical and aesthetic: a world that continues along this trajectory will crush “the human
spirit” entirely.
Kuyper and the Neocalvinists, however, argue
from an explicitly theological orientation: scientific
reductionism and the curse of uniformity is wrong
chiefly because it goes against God’s plan for creation.89 A nation-state that continues along this trajectory will result in a colorless, godless, and dangerously untraditional/progressive environment.
Despite these differences and others,90 however,
they seem to matter little in the broader conclusions that each draws.
Resonances of Anti-Reductionism Today
Barfield’s and the Neocalvinists’ anti-reductionist philosophies are probably best viewed as
overlapping, complementary projects. The sense of
“reductionism,” which each philosophy critiques,

is primarily scientific empiricism (in epistemology)
no one with even a modicum of musical sensiand, with it, physicalist materialism (in ontology),
tivity is likely to be convinced that this scientific
description of the material alterations involved
the results of which are shown to be devastating to
in producing a performance of Chopin’s ballade
individuals and societies. Both philosophies locate
constitutes an exhaustive description of the rethe genesis of problems in the uncritical abstraction
ality in question. No explanation has yet been
of ideas through language, and both treat the episgiven as to why Chopin ordered the sounds as
temological colonialism of modern thought (espehe did …. All these alterations in the physical
cially in the rise in prestige of the natural sciences)
environment are products of Chopin’s intenas a threat to civilization. The distinctive work of
tion, but no amount of study of these material
Kuyper and Clouser causes onlookers to pause and
realities alone will sufficiently reveal what that
ask what we are losing by the changing cultural
intention was. An order may be discerned, harcustoms in society and in the new relationships
monies may be recognized, and a satisfying coamong family, church, eduherence may emerge, but
cation, and state, and if God
if they are divorced from
Barfield‘s and
is being honored. Barfield’s
the life of the composer
distinctive work asks, “If
the Neocalvinists‘
himself, the order, the harmeaninglessness is the remonies, and the melodic
anti-reductionist
sult, what good is scientific
coherence of sounds will
reductionism? And how diphilosophies are
not reveal the full scope
vergent must specialists and
of Chopin’s intent, marprobably best viewed
scholars be before their invel at them though we
ability to integrate their reas overlapping,
may. Indeed, we may marvel. There is no reason to
search threatens the pursuit
complementary
doubt, and experience may
of knowledge itself?”
projects.
easily confirm, that a perThe ongoing importance
son who listens to the balof this subject can be illuslade without knowing who
trated in many ways. But one illustration will sufcomposed
it
can
be
profoundly
moved.
fice as a point of closure; it is an essay by Murray
The
musicologist
could
explain
the ways the
Rae titled “Jesus Christ, the Order of Creation,”
several
melodic
themes
are
woven
together.
And
in the recent book Christ and the Created Order:
so on. Truth is communicated by these means,
91
Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science.
but none of them sufficiently captures the reality
There, Rae essentially reiterates the arguments of
before us. Those tempted in this instance to wield
Barfield regarding meaning and the problem of sciOccam’s razor will leave us bereft. They will leave
entific reductionism—and with just as much pasus knowing less than there is to be known ….
sion. Only instead of poetry, Rae’s analogy is music
The sciences contribute their expertise to exam(particularly, a piece by Chopin). The fact that this
ine and explain how the world is ordered; poets
kind of argument is still being made—and appears
and visual artists and musicians help us see in a
in a volume of this kind—suggests much about its
different light the complex interdependence of
enduring importance. Allow me to quote at length:
things; economists, political theorists, and social
Within its own level of explanation, the science
of acoustics could in theory deliver an exhaustive account of the sounds that combine to produce Chopin’s ballade, of the way those sounds
are produced through the vibration of strings
on a piano, and even of the unique reverberant environment produced when the ballade
is played on a particular piano in a particular
venue under particular ambient conditions. Yet

scientists give insight into the working of human culture and society, while historians provide
a further means of contemplating the realms of
human action and discerning the consequences
of what we do. All these disciplines and more
contribute to our understanding of the world. 92

No sector of human knowledge has a monopoly
on all the rest. The world is rightly experienced as
Pro Rege—March 2021

35

one and as many, and these are complementary
features, not incommensurable realities. While neither Barfield nor the Neocalvinist project is without its problems or inconsistencies, both argued
for these conclusions in a world that needed them.
In today’s world, which is still as modern as postmodern and encourages all the worst aspects of reductionistic epistemologies—generalizations about
race (i.e., scientific racism), sex, gender, nationality, religion—and in a post-COVID world, which
seems bent on either complete uncritical obedience
or disobedience to the scientific establishment, the
relevance of Christian anti-reductionist thought remains is as great as ever.
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